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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—COMMERCE CLAUSE 
AND PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE: 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDS NORTH 
DAKOTA’S NONRESIDENT HUNTING REGULATIONS, 
REAFFIRMING STATES’ RIGHTS TO REGULATE WILDLIFE 
RESOURCES WITHIN THEIR BORDERS 
Minnesota v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006) 
I. FACTS 
In 2001, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly directed the Legisla-
tive Council to study the conflict between resident hunters and nonresident 
hunters.1  The committee reported an increase in the number of nonresident 
hunters in North Dakota from about 5500 in 1990, to about 30,000 in 2001.2  
The growth of nonresident hunters upset resident hunters because they were 
forced to compete for optimal hunting locations.3  Residents claimed that 
the better hunting locations often determined the success of the hunt.4 
On the other hand, the influx of additional hunters provided economic 
growth for many small North Dakota towns.5  Nonresident waterfowl hun-
ters spent nearly twenty-one million dollars in direct expenditures, created 
an estimated 1300 jobs, two million dollars in tax collections, and forty-five 
million dollars in secondary economic effects.6  The business sector op-
posed restricting nonresident hunting because of the increased profits 
generated by the hunters.7 
As a result of these findings, the North Dakota Legislature raised 
license fees for nonresident hunters from $10 to $85 for waterfowl, and $75 
to $85 for small game.8  Residents, on the other hand, had to purchase only 
 
1. Minnesota v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826, 828 (8th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Hoeven II]; see H.R. 
1269, 57th Leg. (N.D. 2001) (studying the conflict between resident hunters and nonresident 
hunters). 






8. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-02(45) (2007) (indicating that the term “small game” 
includes “all game birds and tree squirrels”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-02(16) (2003) (noting 
that the term “game birds” includes “all varieties of geese, brant, swans, ducks, plovers, snipes, 
woodcocks, grouse, sagehens, pheasants, Hungarian partridges, quails, partridges, cranes, rails, 
coots, wild turkeys, morning doves, and crows”). 
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one small game license for $6, rather than purchasing another license to 
hunt waterfowl together with pheasants and grouse, as nonresidents were 
required to do.9  North Dakota also excluded nonresidents from hunting 
during the opening week of waterfowl season.10  Additionally, North 
Dakota restricted access for nonresidents by prohibiting nonresidents from 
hunting on land owned and regulated by the Game and Fish Department 
during the first week of pheasant season.11 
Minnesota’s Attorney General responded by filing a civil suit against 
North Dakota’s Governor, seeking a declaratory judgment to enjoin hunting 
restrictions to the extent that they favored North Dakota residents.12  The 
Attorney General’s office based its theories on both the Commerce Clause13 
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause14 of the United States Constitu-
tion.15  The district court denied Minnesota’s subsequent motion for sum-
mary judgment on its Commerce Clause claims, and granted North 
Dakota’s cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that North Dakota’s 
regulation did not affect “persons in commerce” or activity “substantially 
affecting interstate commerce.”16  The court did not consider North 
Dakota’s motion to dismiss, noting, “Congressional interpretation of what is 
and is not interstate commerce is not controlling on the judicial branch.”17  
Finally, the district court dismissed Minnesota’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause claim, finding the case of Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of 
Montana18 controlling.19 
 
9. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 828 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 20.1-03-03, 20.1-03-12 (2003)). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-08-04.9 (2003)). 
12. Minnesota v. Hoeven, 370 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962 (D.N.D. 2005) [hereinafter Hoeven I]. 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Commerce Clause provides Congress the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”  Id.  The purpose of the Commerce Clause “was to establish a perfect equality amongst 
the several States as to commercial rights, and to prevent unjust and invidious distinctions, which 
local jealousies or local and partial interests might be disposed to introduce and maintain.”  Veazie 
v. Moor, 55 U.S. (1 How.) 568, 574 (1853). 
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.  The Privileges and Immunities Clause states, “[t]he 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several 
States.”  Id.  The secured privileges and immunities are those that “are common to the citizens in 
the latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens. . . .  It was not 
intended by the provision to give to the laws of one State any operation in other States.”  Paul v. 
Virginia, 75 U.S.  (1 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869). 
15. Hoeven I, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 969, 971. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 973 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)). 
18. 436 U.S. 371 (1978). 
19. See Hoeven II, 456 F.3d 826, 834-35 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding Baldwin controlling 
because it previously resolved a Privileges and Immunities challenge to nonresident hunting 
restrictions). 
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Minnesota appealed the district court’s denial of its summary judgment 
motion.20  Specifically, Minnesota argued that the nonresident hunting 
restrictions violated the dormant Commerce Clause21 and certain property 
rights inherent under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.22  The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held the dormant Commerce Clause issue moot 
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim incapable of providing 
relief to Minnesota.23  The court reasoned that the “Reaffirmation of State 
Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 
2005”24 provided the necessary congressional action to preempt Minne-
sota’s dormant Commerce Clause claim.25  The Privileges and Immunities 
Clause did not provide relief, according to the court, because the Clause 
does not protect hunting in the same way that other property rights are 
protected.26 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
historically share a “mutually reinforcing relationship.”27  This relationship 
“stems from their common origin in the Fourth Article of the Articles of 
Confederation and their shared vision of federalism.”28  Both clauses 
 
20. Id. at 829;  see id. at 829-30 n.6 (referencing the amicus curiae brief supporting North 
Dakota, filed jointly by South Dakota, Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Utah, and Wyoming, which are among the states providing residents with preferred access to 
hunting and fishing opportunities). 
21. Id. at 831.  The court can invalidate state laws discriminating against interstate 
commerce, which Minnesota claims to be the effect of the nonresident hunting restrictions.  Id. 
22. Id. at 830. 
23. Id. 
24. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 
Tsunami Relief, H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 6036 (2005). 
25. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 832. 
26. Id. at 836. 
27. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978). 
28. Id. at 531-32.  In Hicklin, the United States Supreme Court explained: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the 
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these states, 
paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all 
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each 
State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy 
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, 
impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively; provided, that 
such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property, imported 
into any State, to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided, also 
that no imposition, duties or restriction, shall be laid by any State on the property of 
the United States, or either of them. 
Id. at 532 n.16 (citing 9 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 908-09 (1777) (Library of 
Congress ed., 1907)). 
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recognize the states’ need to be free from federal control, while at the same 
time avoiding arbitrary distinctions forced upon nonresidents that may 
hinder interstate commerce.29  However, while the two clauses share a simi-
lar focus, the analytical framework from which claims are evaluated varies 
for each clause.30 
A. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The Commerce Clause provides that “Congress shall have power [t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”31  A “positive” Commerce Clause challenge asks 
whether Congress has exceeded its authority in regulating certain activi-
ties.32  The United States Supreme Court has also read a “negative” or “dor-
mant” element into this affirmative language that allows courts to invalidate 
state laws that are discriminatory to interstate commerce.33  The purpose of 
invalidating discriminatory state statutes is to protect against the economic 
isolationism that hindered the early formation of the states.34  Instead of 
retaliating against other states by taking protectionist measures, states form 
a more solid union with each other through enforcement of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.35 
While remaining vigilant against economic isolationism, courts strug-
gled to protect a state’s ability to benefit its own citizens.36  The test used 
by courts for Commerce Clause challenges is two-fold: first, it must be 
determined whether the challenged law discriminates against interstate 
commerce.37  Discrimination, in this context, is equivalent to differential 
treatment benefiting in-state economic interests over out-of-state economic 
interests.38  In the second part of the test, if a state law does discriminate 
 
29. Schutz v. Wyoming, No. 02-CV-165-D, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *25-26 (D. 
Wyo. May 28, 2003), aff’d, Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005). 
30. Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 993 (9th Cir. 2002). 
31. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. 
32. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
33. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1997) 
(“In short, the Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a 
limitation upon the power of the States.”) (citation omitted); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981) (“Even in the absence of congressional action, the 
courts may decide whether state regulations challenged under the Commerce Clause 
impermissibly burden interstate commerce.”) (citation omitted). 
34. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979); see Camps, 520 U.S. at 578 (“By 
encouraging economic isolationism, prohibitions on out-of-state access to in-state resources serve 
the very evil that the dormant Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.”). 
35. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335. 
36. Conservation Force, 301 F.3d at 991. 
37. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 2004). 
38. Id. (quoting S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 593 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
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against interstate commerce, strict scrutiny is applied to assess whether the 
state’s discrimination is narrowly tailored to further a legitimate state 
interest.39  If the law does not discriminate, but only incidentally affects 
interstate commerce, the law will be upheld “unless the burden imposed on 
[interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”40 
Historically, Commerce Clause challenges in wildlife regulation cases 
have centered on whether interstate commerce is implicated.41  In Geer v. 
Connecticut,42 a Connecticut statute prohibited the out-of-state transfer of 
game birds that were lawfully killed within the state.43  The United States 
Supreme Court held that the people of a state own wildlife collectively, and 
thus, the state, as the representative for the people, could affix conditions in 
association with the ownership of wild game.44  Following this principle, 
the Court then distinguished interstate commerce from internal commerce, 
finding the former not applicable because of the state’s right to affix condi-
tions relative to ownership and taking of wild game within its borders.45  
One of these conditions of common ownership related to the challenged 
statute itself, because Connecticut had a right to keep the property within its 
jurisdiction by forbidding the removal of wild game from state borders.46 
Over several decades, the United States Supreme Court gradually 
retreated from the ownership view taken in Geer.47  In Douglas v. Seacoast 
Products, Inc.,48 the Supreme Court definitively rejected the theory.49  In 
 
39. Id. 
40. Id. (citation omitted). 
41. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 532 (1896) (finding no relation to interstate 
commerce in the state’s control of wildlife within its borders); State v. McCullagh, 153 P. 557, 
558 (Kan. 1915) (“The natural flight of wild fowl from one point to another does not constitute 
‘commerce,’ unless that word be expanded beyond any significance heretofore given it.”).  But see 
Conservation Force, Inc., 301 F.3d at 995 (concluding the hunting of bull elk and antlered deer 
substantially affects interstate commerce). 
42. 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
43. Geer, 161 U.S. at 519. 
44. Id. at 529. 
45. Id. at 530-31. 
46. Id. at 529-30; see also McCullagh, 153 P. at 559 (recognizing the ability of states to grant 
hunting privileges to residents and to the exclusion of nonresidents based on the state’s control 
over wild animals). 
47. See Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1928) (distinguishing 
Geer to find an act that prohibited the exportation of shrimp to be in violation of the Commerce 
Clause); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (“Wild birds are not in the possession of 
anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership”); West v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 
229, 262 (1911) (finding an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the transportation of gas out of the state 
to be an unjustified restraint upon interstate commerce). 
48. 431 U.S. 265 (1977). 
49. Douglas, 431 U.S. at 284 (“[I]t is pure fantasy to talk of ‘owning’ wild fish, birds, or 
animals.”). 
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Douglas, a Virginia statute restricted the ability of nonresidents to obtain 
licenses for certain kinds of fish in selected areas.50  The Court called the 
Geer sense of ownership “a nineteenth-century legal fiction” and instead 
asked whether the state exceeded its boundaries under its police power.51  
The Court held that Virginia surpassed its afforded police power by grant-
ing residents, but not nonresidents, the right to destroy a natural resource, 
which did not square with any asserted conservation interest.52 
The United States Supreme Court reinforced the Douglas holding just 
two years later in Hughes v. Oklahoma,53 which involved a Commerce 
Clause challenge to an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale or transfer of 
minnows outside of the state.54  The Court expressly overruled Geer, 
presenting the issue as: 
(1) [W]hether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with 
only “incidental” effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates 
against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect;  
(2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so,  
(3) whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as 
well without discriminating against interstate commerce.55 
Following this analytical framework, the Court found that the statute 
intruded upon interstate commerce.56  While the statute served a legitimate 
purpose, the Court ultimately held that Oklahoma did not choose the least 
discriminatory alternative for conservation because no limits were imposed 
intrastate, and instead limits were only imposed on the out-of-state trans-
fer.57  After Hughes, states may still regulate and conserve wildlife within 
their borders, but the state must have a legitimate purpose that is not 
contrary to interstate commerce.58 
By finding this required legitimate purpose, the Ninth Circuit, in 
Conservation Force v. Manning,59 upheld Arizona’s ten-percent cap on 
nonresident hunting of bull elk and antlered deer.60  First, the Ninth Circuit 
 
50. Id. at 269. 
51. Id. at 284-85. 
52. Id. at 285 & n.21. 
53. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
54. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 323. 
55. Id. at 325, 335-36. 
56. Id. at 336-37. 
57. Id. at 337-38. 
58. Id. at 338-39. 
59. 301 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2002). 
60. Conservation Force, Inc., 301 F.3d at 988. 
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tested whether the regulation affected interstate commerce.61  The court 
discussed the non-recreational aspects of hunting, such as selling portions 
of the wildlife in interstate and international markets.62  By excluding non-
residents from these markets, the court concluded that the regulation “bur-
dens interstate commerce at its point of supply.”63 
The Ninth Circuit next addressed Arizona’s interests in conserving 
wildlife and preserving hunting opportunities for residents.64  The court first 
agreed with Arizona that these interests were legitimate, because it recog-
nized the solid history of upholding states’ rights to protect wildlife and 
provide recreation to their people.65  However, the court questioned whether 
Arizona’s regulation was narrowly tailored, because a state must show more 
to discriminate than political demand or pressure from other states.66  This 
political pressure provided a speculative basis for the regulation, rather than 
any actual need for more hunting opportunities by Arizona residents, 
because the residents received more than eighty percent of the hunting tags 
issued and experienced little nonresident pressure.67  Thus, the court re-
manded the case to determine whether Arizona met its burden.68 
In Schutz v. Wyoming69 the district court of Wyoming reached a direct-
ly conflicting result with Conservation Force.70  Schutz involved a chal-
lenge to three game statutes that provided benefits to residents over non-
residents.71  First, the court refused to apply a dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis because Toomer v. Witsell72 and Hughes decided that an animal is 
not an article of interstate commerce until it has been captured or killed.73  
The court also relied on Baldwin,74 which, although decided in a Privileges 
and Immunities Clause context, held a very similar quota statute 
 
61. Id. at 993. 
62. Id. at 994. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 996. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 999. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1000. 
69. No. 02-CV-165-D, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518 (D. Wyo. May 29, 2003), aff’d, Schutz 
v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005). 
70. Schutz, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *29. 
71. Id. at *2. 
72. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).  The United States Supreme Court in Toomer found commercial 
shrimping to be protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, in part because migratory 
shrimp traveled between different waters.  Toomer, 334 U.S. at 401-03. 
73. Schutz, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *22-23. 
74. Baldwin found that elk hunting was not protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.  Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978). 
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constitutional.75  Conservation Force, according to the Schutz court, made 
“a curious jump in logic” when it ignored the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Baldwin in favor of a “substantial effects on interstate commerce” analy-
sis.76  The state did not regulate economic activity, but merely controlled 
the activity of hunting, according to the court.77  Thus, the court found the 
dormant Commerce Clause inapplicable to the statutes.78 
At the appellate level, the Tenth Circuit found it unnecessary to reach 
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis because congressional action made 
the claim moot.79  The Tenth Circuit noted that a constitutional claim must 
be alive at all stages, including during appellate review.80  Additionally, 
when Congress acts, it terminates any dormant Commerce Clause claim 
because the dormant Commerce Clause is based on congressional silence.81  
Congress provided this action when it passed the “Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief, 2005.”82  This Act explicitly stated that it is in the public interest for 
states to distinguish between residents and nonresidents in regulating the 
taking of wildlife.83  Thus, the Tenth Circuit found the dormant Commerce 
Clause claim moot when this Act was signed into law.84  The Tenth Cir-
cuit’s holding appears to be more consistent with previous case law, rather 
than the Ninth Circuit’s “unprecedented” ruling.85 
B. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause states, “The Citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States.”86  The purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
like the Commerce Clause, is to “help fuse into one Nation a collection of 
 
75. Schutz, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *26. 
76. Id. at *25. 
77. Id. at *29. 
78. Id. 
79. Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005). 
80. Id.  Schutz cited Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997), which 
held that the case and controversy “must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time 
the complaint is filed.”  Id. 
81. Id.  Schutz found that Congress “unmistakably foreclosed dormant Commerce Clause 
petitions challenging state hunting and fishing statutes that treat nonresidents differently than 
residents.”  Id. 
82. Id. (referring to H.R. 1268, Section 6063). 
83. Id. (citing Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on 
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, H.R. 1268, 108th Cong. § 6036 (2005)). 
84. Id. 
85. Hoeven I, 370 F. Supp. 2d 960, 972 (D.N.D. 2005). 
86. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
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independent, sovereign States.”87  However, this does not mean a nonresi-
dent is entitled to every privilege as a resident of a state.88  Rather, the 
privileges and immunities protected are those common to citizens among 
the states.89 
Like the Commerce Clause analysis, a court must undergo a two-part 
inquiry to assess whether the differential treatment of nonresidents violates 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.90  The first part of the inquiry 
addresses whether a privilege or immunity protected by the Clause is impli-
cated in the discrimination.91  Some distinctions are permitted because the 
courts recognize that certain inherent differences will arise among the 
several states.92  The second prong of the test seeks to determine if there is a 
privilege or immunity implicated, and whether sufficient justification exists 
for the differential treatment.93  When assessing the sufficient justification 
prong, courts hearing challenges under the Clause should recognize “the 
principle that the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local 
evils and in prescribing appropriate cures.”94 
The two prongs are not clearly defined guidelines in application due to 
a lackluster case law history.95  Like the Commerce Clause, early cases 
established that the state had complete control over wildlife within its 
borders.96  In Corfield v. Coryell,97 the Circuit Court in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania analyzed whether a state act regulating oyster control 
implicated fundamental privileges and immunities.98  While the court 
declined to enumerate every fundamental privilege and immunity, the court 
specified certain general categories: “[p]rotection by the government; the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property 
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject 
 
87. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (footnote omitted). 
88. See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898) (“There are privileges that may be 
accorded by a State to its own people in which citizens of other States may not participate except 
in conformity to such reasonable regulations as may be established by the State.”). 
89. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869). 
90. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984). 
91. Id. 
92. See id. (“Only with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the 
vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, 
equally.”). 
93. Id. at 222. 
94. Id. at 222-23 (citation omitted). 
95. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1978). 
96. Id. at 384. 
97. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).  The Court described Corfield as “the first, 
and long the leading, explication of the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause.” Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 
384 (quoting Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975)). 
98. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551. 
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nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for 
the general good of the whole.”99  The court in Corfield concluded the state 
could restrict access to the oyster beds because the oyster beds might be 
completely destroyed if the state was unable to regulate their use and 
exclude nonresidents.100 
In Paul v. Virginia,101 the United States Supreme Court again stressed 
the freedom enjoyed by citizens in the “acquisition and enjoyment of prop-
erty and in the pursuit of happiness.”102  The Court stated that these enjoyed 
privileges are those that are enjoyed in one’s own state.103  The specific 
holding in Paul turned largely on an analysis of a corporation’s status as a 
citizen of the state.104  The Court ultimately held that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause did not protect a New York insurance company doing 
business in Virginia.105 
The United States Supreme Court in McCready v. Virginia106 reiterated 
the Corfield analysis of protecting only fundamental privileges and immu-
nities.107  McCready, like Corfield, involved a statute excluding nonresi-
dents, but not residents, from planting oysters.108  The United States 
Supreme Court again refused to establish specific categories of fundamental 
privileges and immunities, opting instead for a case-by-case determina-
tion.109  The particular right of a nonresident to plant oysters that was 
asserted in McCready was not fundamental, and thus did not trigger protec-
tion by the Clause.110  Rather, it was a common property right held by the 
citizens of Virginia.111 
The United States Supreme Court decided another corporate privileges 
matter in Blake v. McClung,112 where a Tennessee statute gave creditors in 
that state priority over out-of-state creditors.113  The Court held that this 
statute offended the Privileges and Immunities Clause because creditors 
should not be discriminated against merely because they do not reside in the 
 
99. Id. at 551-52. 
100. Id. at 552. 
101. 75 U.S. 168 (1869). 
102. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180. 
103. Id. at 180-81. 
104. Id. at 182. 
105. Id. 
106. 94 U.S. 391 (1876). 
107. McCready, 94 U.S. at 395. 
108. Id. at 394. 
109. Id. at 395. 
110. Id. at 395-96. 
111. Id. 
112. 172 U.S. 239 (1898). 
113. Blake, 172 U.S. at 247. 
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state.114  The Court again reaffirmed that not all Privileges are protected, 
rather, “[t]he Constitution forbids only such legislation affecting citizens of 
the respective States as will substantially or practically put a citizen of one 
State in a condition of alienage when he is within or when he removes to 
another State.”115 
While supporting ownership rights in some cases, the United States 
Supreme Court refused to establish any absolute ownership rights.116  In 
Toomer, a South Carolina statute restricted nonresidents from trawling for 
migratory shrimp in certain waters.117  The nonresidents specifically chal-
lenged the imposed license fees, which South Carolina set at a price one 
hundred times greater than the residents’ license fees.118  According to the 
Toomer Court, these license fees clearly discriminated against nonresidents, 
thus meeting the first prong of the analysis.119  Under the second prong, 
South Carolina justified the license fee discrepancy by claiming underlying 
conservation purposes.120  The Court rejected this argument, however, be-
cause the conservation aims could have been achieved through less severe 
methods than the one chosen, which effectively excluded all nonresi-
dents.121  The facts in Toomer were also distinguished from McCready, 
because the former involved migratory fish in different waters.122  This 
distinction compelled the United States Supreme Court to reject an exten-
sion to McCready, and instead to find commercial shrimping protected by 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.123 
Despite the law’s evolution away from the ownership theory in Geer, 
courts have continued to reaffirm the states’ power to regulate wildlife 
within its borders.124  For example, in State v. Kemp,125 the South Dakota 
Supreme Court upheld a statute that completely excluded nonresidents from 
hunting migratory wildfowl.126  The South Dakota Supreme Court conceded 
 
114. Id. at 258. 
115. Id. at 256. 
116. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 385 (1978). 
117. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 389. 
118. Id. at 395. 
119. Id. at 396-97. 
120. Id. at 397. 
121. Id. at 398-99. 
122. Id. at 401. 
123. Id. at 403. 
124. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1978).  The Court stated in 
Baldwin that “[t]he fact that the State’s control over wildlife is not exclusive and absolute in the 
face of federal regulation and certain federally protected interests does not compel the conclusion 
that it is meaningless in their absence.”  Id. 
125. 44 N.W.2d 214 (S.D. 1950). 
126. Kemp, 44 N.W.2d at 219. 
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the diminished effect of the complete ownership theory and held the state’s 
police power was an adequate basis for enacting the statute.127  The court 
deferred to the state’s ability to cure local problems and its holding recog-
nized the dangers of destruction posed from exhaustive nonresident hunt-
ing.128  The Kemp court also reinforced the difference acknowledged in 
Toomer between the right of an individual to make a living through com-
mercial hunting, and hunting for sport or enjoyment with no regard to 
making a livelihood.129  The Clause affords no protection to the latter.130 
The modern seminal case in hunting rights analysis is Baldwin, which 
found that elk hunting was not within the fundamental rights protected by 
the Clause.131  In Baldwin, a nonresident was charged seven and a half 
times more than a resident for a combination license, or twenty-five times 
more than a resident if he wished to only hunt elk.132  In its analysis, the 
United States Supreme Court first insisted on the continuing vitality of its 
earlier decisions concerning the pursuit of a common calling and other basic 
activities.133  The Court refused to recognize elk hunting as one of these 
protected rights, however, and, instead, determined it was recreation and 
sport.134  It was not a means to one’s livelihood or basic to the “well-being 
of the Union.”135  As in its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court again re-
fused to define specific protected privileges and immunities; it sufficed to 
determine that elk hunting was not one of them.136  The Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Hoeven analogized waterfowl hunting to the unpro-
tected elk hunting in Baldwin, and thus upheld the nonresident hunting 
restrictions as constitutional under the Clause.137 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Hoeven, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously upheld 
North Dakota’s restrictions on nonresident waterfowl hunting within the 
state.138  The court sought to determine whether the hunting restrictions 
 
127. Id. at 217. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 218. 
130. Id. 
131. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978). 
132. Id. at 374. 
133. Id. at 387. 
134. Id. at 388. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 834.   
138. Id. at 827. 
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violated the Commerce Clause.139  The merits of this issue were never 
reached, however, because the enactment of the “Reaffirmation of State 
Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005” 
rendered the Commerce Clause claim moot.140 
Next, the court analyzed whether the nonresident hunting restrictions 
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.141  The court foreclosed the 
issue on the first prong of the analytical framework because recreational 
hunting is not a fundamental right protected by the Clause.142  Furthermore, 
while the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects property rights, these 
property rights do not include hunting, according to the court, and thus 
hunting rights garner no protection under the Clause.143 
A. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Minnesota claimed that North Dakota’s nonresident hunting restric-
tions violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the restrictions bar 
thousands of nonresidents from traveling to North Dakota to hunt 
waterfowl.144  These nonresidents, according to Minnesota, are persons in 
commerce that engage in activities substantially affecting interstate 
commerce.145  Minnesota primarily relied on Conservation Force, where 
Arizona placed a ten percent cap on the number of nonresident tags for bull 
elk and antlered deer.146  Conservation Force found the dormant Commerce 
Clause applicable because, according to the court, the hunting of bull elk 
and antlered deer substantially affects interstate commerce.147 
While the court acknowledged the economic growth generated by 
nonresident hunting in North Dakota, it declined to address the merits of the 
Commerce Clause claim because Section 6063 of H.R. 1268, the 
“Reaffirmation of State Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting 
and Fishing Act of 2005,” rendered the claim moot.148  President George W. 
Bush signed this Act into law on May 10, 2005, while this case was 
 
139. Id. at 831. 
140. Id. at 831-32. 
141. Id. at 833-34. 
142. Id. at 834. 
143. Id. at 836. 
144. Id. at 831 (citing Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 39, Hoeven v. Minnesota, No. 05-3012 
(8th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005)). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 833 (citing Conservation Force v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
147. Id. at 832 n.7 (citing Conservation Force, 301 F.3d at 995). 
148. Id. at 831.  Though the larger scope of H.R. 1268 (the “Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief”) was not 
germane to the present case, Section 6063 (the “Reaffirmation of State Regulation of Resident and 
Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005”) applied directly to the issue before the court.  Id. 
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pending appeal.149  The Act stated that it was in the public interest for states 
to regulate fish and wildlife within its boundaries.150  These regulations 
include distinguishing between residents and nonresidents in licenses or 
permits, in the type of wildlife that may be taken, or in the fees the state 
charges to issue hunting licenses.151  Finally, the Act stated that congres-
sional silence is not a barrier to states’ regulation of hunting or fishing.152 
In construing the Act, the Eighth Circuit discussed Schutz v. Thorne,153 
a Tenth Circuit case involving a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to 
Wyoming’s nonresident hunting license fee scheme.154  Schutz stated that 
“[t]he essential element of a dormant Commerce Clause claim is congres-
sional inaction, so when Congress does act, the dormancy ends, thus leav-
ing the courts obliged to follow congressional will.”155  Schutz found that 
H.R. 1268 provided for this congressional action, ending the dormancy and 
rendering the claim moot.156 
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Tenth Circuit by finding H.R. 1268 
sufficient to end Minnesota’s dormant Commerce Clause claim.157  First, 
the Eighth Circuit overruled the district court’s analysis that “[c]ongres-
sional interpretation of what is and is not commerce is not controlling on 
the judicial branch.”158  This premise was based on United States v. 
Lopez,159 which involved a “positive” Commerce Clause challenge to 
 
149. Id.  The test for mootness applies at all stages of the judicial process, including during 
appellate review.  See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (“[A]n 
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is 
filed.”) (citation omitted); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (“A case is 
moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest 
in the outcome.”) (citation omitted); Republican Party v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 
2004) (reinforcing that federal courts cannot give opinions on abstract questions of law that are 
not materially before the court). 
150. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 831 (citing Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 6036 (2005)). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005).    
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 832 (quoting Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
156. Id. 
157. Id.; see Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 72 (1997) (finding the 
claim moot when the plaintiff took up private sector employment, where her speech was not 
governed by the article at issue); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 
U.S. 648, 655 (1981) (rejecting a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to California’s retaliatory 
tax because the McCarran-Ferguson Act removed any Commerce Clause limitations on the states 
to regulate insurance); Republican Party v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding 
claims moot when the criminal charges, which were a necessary element to the claims, were 
dismissed). 
158. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d 826, 832 (8th Cir. 2006). 
159. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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congressional action in passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.160  
The present case, on the other hand, arose out of a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge.161  In a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, the court 
determines “whether the state’s law discriminates against interstate com-
merce and whether sufficient justification exists for the burden imposed.”162  
The distinction is imperative because, with regard to dormant Commerce 
Clause claims, the Supreme Court has held that, “[i]f Congress ordains that 
the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any action 
taken by a State within the scope of the congressional authorization is 
rendered invulnerable to a Commerce Clause challenge.”163  Consequently, 
H.R. 1268 permitted North Dakota to restrict nonresident hunting in a 
manner consistent with the scope of the congressional action.164 
Minnesota countered that H.R. 1268 was part of an appropriations bill, 
and thus the Congressional action was only a temporary measure.165  While 
appropriations acts generally operate for only one fiscal year, the language 
of the provision at issue may indicate it is intended to be permanent.166  For 
example, an indicia of permanence exists when the provision has no appro-
priation attached to it.167  However, the critical element is the existence of 
words that intend to make the provision apply in the future, because Con-
gress will use these words when it intends to make a provision permanent in 
nature.168 
The Eighth Circuit interpreted section 6036 to contain these necessary 
words of futurity.169  Section 6036(b)(1) provides, “It is the policy of Con-
gress that it is in the public interest for each State to continue to regulate 
the taking for any purpose of fish and wildlife within its boundaries, includ-
ing by means of laws or regulations that differentiate between residents and 
 
160. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 832 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551).  The Supreme Court in 
Lopez said that Congress “could not decide the outer limits of its power to regulate interstate 
commerce.”  Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-58). 
161. Id. at 830. 
162. Id. at 831 (citing Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
163. Id. at 832 (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 652-53). 
164. Id. at 831. 
165. Id. at 833. 
166. Id. (citing Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Martin, 961 F.2d 269, 273-74 (D.C. Cir. 
1992)). 
167. Id. (citing United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 892 F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (Fed. Cir. 
1989)); see Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, 961 F.2d at 274 (noting that the absence of an 
appropriation is an indication of permanence). 
168. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d 826, 833 (8th Cir. 2006); see Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 892 F.2d at 
1009 (“Had Congress intended to make the exception permanent, it knew how: it could and we 
believe would have used words of futurity, like ‘hereafter, notwithstanding any other provisions of 
law[.]’”). 
169. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 833. 
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nonresidents of such State.”170  The language necessarily implies the words 
of futurity, as states could not “continue” to regulate hunting consistent 
with congressional policy if Congress intended the Act to apply only tem-
porarily.171  Section 6036(b)(2) continues, “[s]ilence on the part of Con-
gress shall not be construed to impose any barrier” to regulation under the 
Commerce Clause.172  If Congress intended only temporary action, it would 
not give silence the effect of approving continued state regulation.173 
Aside from a plain reading of section 6036, the court also considered 
the context within which the legislation was passed.174  The court had “no 
doubt” that the Act arose in response to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 
Conservation Force, which found that Arizona’s cap on nonresident 
hunting was discriminatory to interstate commerce.175  The Ninth Circuit in 
Conservation Force distinguished the facts from Baldwin because the cap 
was not limited to recreational hunting.176  Minnesota relied heavily on this 
unusual ruling in Conservation Force in constructing its dormant Com-
merce Clause claim.177  But the Eighth Circuit, while declining to reach the 
merits of the dormant Commerce Clause claim, followed the permitted dis-
tinctions between nonresidents and residents contained in Congress’s enact-
ment of the “Reaffirmation of State Regulation of Resident and Nonresident 
Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005.”178 
B. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
Minnesota’s second claim alleged that North Dakota’s nonresident 
hunting restrictions violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.179  The 
two-pronged Privileges and Immunities Clause framework considers: (1) 
whether the law discriminates against a protected privilege or immunity; 
 
170. Id. (quoting H.R. 1268 § 6036(b)(1) (2005)) (emphasis added). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. (quoting H.R. 1268 § 6036(b)(2) (2005)). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. See id.  (“The committee report expressed concern that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
‘could have an effect on the thinking of Federal courts across the country.’”) (quoting 151 CONG. 
REC. H2997-02, at 3023 (2005)). 
176. Id. at 832 n.7; see Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 
2002) (noting that Arizona’s hunting regulations substantially affect the interstate market of 
nonedible portions of bull elk and antlered deer that are sold). 
177. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 833 (citing Minnesota v. Hoeven, 370 F. Supp. 2d 960, 971 
(D.N.D. 2005)); see Schutz v. Wyoming, No. 02-CV-165-D, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at 
*18-19 (D. Wyo. May 28, 2003), aff’d, Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding 
Conservation Force to be unprecedented in its Commerce Clause analysis because it is 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent). 
178. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 833. 
179. Id. 
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and (2) whether sufficient justification exists for the discrimination.180  
However, after considering Baldwin, the Eighth Circuit found it unneces-
sary to reach the second prong of the analysis.181 
1. Fundamental Rights Analysis 
The Eighth Circuit turned to the United States Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Baldwin to determine whether hunting constituted a fundamental 
right.182  The Supreme Court recognized that only those privileges and 
immunities deemed to be fundamental are protected by the Clause.183  In 
Baldwin, the United States Supreme Court encountered a Privileges and 
Immunities Clause claim based on Montana’s licensing scheme for elk 
hunting, which charged nonresidents significantly higher rates than resi-
dents.184  The Baldwin Court determined that elk hunting is a recreational 
activity.185  Nonresidents are not excluded from elk hunting, Baldwin main-
tained, and in fact, many nonresidents sacrifice to participate in the sport.186  
Thus, because it is only recreation, the Baldwin Court held elk hunting was 
not a fundamental right under the Clause.187  The Eighth Circuit found 
waterfowl hunting to be like the elk hunting analyzed in Baldwin; both are 
recreation.188  Furthermore, livelihood and the basic right to the well being 
of the Union are not implicated in waterfowl hunting.189 
2. Hunting Is Not a Property Right 
Minnesota recognized Baldwin’s authority, but distinguished the pre-
sent facts through a property rights analysis, which was not addressed in 
Baldwin.190  According to this argument, North Dakota discriminated a-
gainst nonresidents who owned or leased property in North Dakota, because 
 




183. Id. (citing Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978)). 
184. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d 826, 834 (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 378-79). 
185. Id. (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388). 
186. Id.  
187. Id.  
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 834-35.  Baldwin recognized that the Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents a 
state from imposing unreasonable burdens “in the ownership and disposition of privately held 
property within the State.”  Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383 (citing Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 258 
(1898)). 
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they were not able to hunt on their own property in a manner consistent 
with resident owners and lessees.191 
The Eighth Circuit considered North Dakota law to see whether there is 
a property right to hunt associated with the purchase or lease of land.192  At 
common law, a landowner did have the right to hunt wildlife on his land.193  
However, the North Dakota Constitution provides that hunting “will be 
forever preserved for the people and managed by law and regulation for the 
public good.”194  Additionally, the North Dakota Century Code reaffirms 
the state’s control over wildlife.195  The state owns all wildlife “for the pur-
pose of regulating the enjoyment, use, possession, disposition, and conser-
vation thereof.”196  Furthermore, North Dakota reserves the right to 
prescribe the manner, number, place, and time in which wildlife may be 
taken.197  Finally, except under certain exceptions, residents and nonresi-
dents may not hunt or take game without a license.198  The Eighth Circuit 
also recognized the North Dakota Supreme Court’s approval of these 
statutory schemes.199 
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that North Dakota permitted 
residents to hunt small game, fish, or trap during the open season without a 
license on their own land.200  However, the court distinguished the type of 
discrimination apparent in this statute—the discrimination is against nonres-
ident recreational hunting, which is not protected under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.201  Furthermore, this provision is only a limited excep-
tion to the general prohibition against hunting without a license.202 
Finally, Minnesota analogized Paul v. Virginia,203 Corfield, and Blake, 
three historical cases dealing with property rights.204  The Eight Circuit 
 
191. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 835. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. (quoting Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1575 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
194. Id. (citing N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 27). 
195. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-03 (2003)). 
196. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-03 (2003)). 
197. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-08-04 (2003)). 
198. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 20.1-03-03, -07 (2003)). 
199. See id. at 835 (citing State ex rel. Stuart v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59, 61 
(1972) (holding that the state has the power to set conditions for reducing wildlife to ownership); 
State v. Hastings, 41 N.W.2d 305, 308 (N.D. 1950) (following the statutory scheme for acquiring 
title to or the right to sell muskrat pelts). 
200. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 835 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-03-04 (2003)). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-03-03 (2003)). 
203. 75 U.S. 168 (1869).  
204. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 836.  Paul discussed citizens’ freedom in acquiring property, and 
the recognition of this right in other states.  Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180-81 (1869).  In 
Corfield, the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania categorically recognized the right to acquire and 
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recognized the authority of these cases, to the extent they are consistent 
with Baldwin in protecting property rights.205  However, the court reasoned 
that nothing in these cases or any others establishes hunting as part of the 
bundle of property rights associated with the ownership or leasing of 
land.206  Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim failed 
because North Dakota’s nonresident hunting regulations did not implicate a 
fundamental right.207 
IV. IMPACT 
Hoeven represents a significant reaffirmation of states’ rights to regu-
late wildlife within their borders.208  North Dakota officials and residents 
praised the publicized ruling, while Minnesota officials criticized it as pro-
tectionism.209  With the court battle likely over, both sides are contem-
plating how to best manage wildlife in the future to serve the competing 
interests of residents and nonresidents.210 
A. STATES’ POWER TO FAVOR RESIDENTS 
As a result of Hoeven, states will continue to grant preferred access to 
residents over nonresidents in hunting and fishing opportunities.211  This is 
evident already in the Kansas district court case Taulman v. Hayden,212 
which involved a Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge by a nonresi-
dent hunter who owned land in Kansas, similar to Hoeven.213  The district 
court conducted an analysis that was nearly identical to Hoeven.214  First, 
 
possess property.  Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).  In Blake, 
the Supreme Court while reaffirming that not all Privileges are protected, held that a state could 
not discriminate against a creditor merely because of its out-of-state status.  Blake v. McClung, 
172 U.S. 239, 258 (1898). 
205. Id. 
206. Id.  These cases only concern the proposition that the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
protects property rights in general.  Hunting rights are not held to be part of these protected rights, 
however, in any of the cases.  Id. 
207. See id. (dismissing the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim after finding hunting not 
a protected fundamental right). 
208. Press Release, N.D. Att’y Gen., North Dakota’s Nonresident Hunting Laws Upheld, 
(Aug. 3, 2006), available at http://www.ag.state.nd.us/documents/08-03-06.pdf. 
209. Doug Smith, New Bill Won’t Affect State’s Lawsuit, STAR TRIB. (M.N.), May 15, 2005, 
at 15C. 
210. Tom Rafferty, North Dakota Wins Hunting Case, BISMARCK TRIB. (N.D.), Aug. 4, 
2006, at 1. 
211. See Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 829 n.6 (providing laws of South Dakota, Alaska, Colorado, 
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and other states that give preference to 
residents over nonresidents in hunting and fishing opportunities). 
212. No. 05-1118, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65493 (D. Kan. Sept. 13, 2006). 
213. Taulman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65493, at *1. 
214. Id. at *12. 
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the court recognized that only fundamental rights are protected.215  Next, 
the district court analogized the facts of the case to Baldwin.216  The plain-
tiff in Taulman distinguished this case from Baldwin, however, because he 
did not hunt for recreation, but rather “to teach his children about hunting 
traditions, use the animals for food, use the animal hides and antlers, 
strengthen family bonds, and instill an appreciation of nature.”217  The 
district court found that these motivations, although valid, were still not 
basic to the well-being of the Union, and thus not fundamental and deserv-
ing of protection.218 
The district court in Taulman then directly followed Hoeven in its 
determination of a landowner’s right to hunt.219  Like the Eighth Circuit, the 
Kansas district court looked to state law to determine the nature of the 
landowner’s right to hunt.220  While the statutory scheme differed slightly 
between Kansas and North Dakota, the district court arrived at the same 
conclusion, finding that the right of a nonresident landowner to access his 
land in the same manner as residents was not fundamental.221  The district 
court thus declined to reach the second prong of the analysis and upheld the 
nonresident hunting restrictions.222 
States may now use Hoeven to extend nonresident restrictions even 
further than those now in effect.223  Furthermore, states could attempt to 
extend Hoeven to other areas of law when granting residents preferred ben-
efits over nonresidents.224  Previous case law, in some respects, encourages 
this extension because the fundamental rights protected by the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause are not enumerated.225 
But states also realize the immense economic benefits generated from 
nonresident hunting.226  In Missouri, for example, hunting generates reve-
nue of over $853 million annually, and at least $148 million of this comes 
 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at *12-13. 
217. Id. at *14. 
218. Id. at *15. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at *19. 
222. Id. 
223. Smith, supra note 209, at 15C. 
224. See 35A AM. JUR. 2D Fish, Game, and Wildlife Conservation § 41 (2006) (“The inquiry 
in each case must be concerned with the question as to whether reasons for differentiation between 
residents and nonresidents exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to 
them.”). 
225. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978). 
226. Ken Newton, “Big-Game Bucks”: Out-of-State Hunters Funnel Money Into the Region, 
ST. JOSEPH NEWS-PRESS (Mo.), Nov. 19, 2006, at State & Regional News. 
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from nonresident hunters.227  This is not an isolated occurrence, as commu-
nities nationwide benefit from the economic surplus brought by nonresident 
hunters.228  According to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, hunt-
ing expenditures accounted for a total of $20.6 billion in 2001, including 
approximately $5.3 billion in trip-related expenses alone.229  Migratory bird 
hunters alone spent $1.4 billion for hunting trips and equipment in 2001.230 
Such statistics are impressive when considering the ripple effects 
throughout the economy.231  For example, waterfowl hunting expenditures 
in 2001 created 21,415 jobs, over $129.5 million in state tax revenue, and 
$201.8 million in federal tax revenue.232  The Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Hoeven may impact some of the $2.3 billion in total economic output 
generated by waterfowl hunters if nonresident hunters reduce their expendi-
tures or stop hunting out-of-state due to increased restrictions like those 
upheld in Hoeven.233 
B. NORTH DAKOTA 
The impact on North Dakota is more readily apparent as the balancing 
of resident and nonresident interests continues to be one of the biggest 
challenges faced by the North Dakota Game and Fish Department, the 
North Dakota Legislature, and local communities.234  North Dakota officials 
are satisfied with Hoeven’s “implications on future wildlife-management 
decisions.”235  But it is not yet known whether the present restrictions will 
satisfy North Dakota residents’ concerns over competition for prime hunt-
ing spots, although other circumstances, such as environmental conditions, 




229. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 2001 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING, HUNTING, AND 
WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION 32 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2002pubs/FHW01.pdf. 
230. Id. at 34. 
231. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WATERFOWL HUNTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES: ADDENDUM TO THE 2001 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING, HUNTING, AND 
WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION 10 (2005), available at http://library.fws.gov/nat_ 
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The Legislative Council’s report, which was the basis of the restric-
tions in Hoeven, recognized that time restrictions on nonresident hunters 
might not solve the residents’ calls for greater hunting opportunity.237  This 
is because waterfowl hunting depends largely on the timing of migration, 
which, in turn, depends on the weather.238  In a recent national duck hunter 
survey, North Dakota hunters responded that over the past five years, the 
habitats where they hunt were neither better nor worse, and the overall 
quality of their hunts was about the same.239 
While hunting quality assessments are tougher to make, the quantita-
tive data shows increased growth in both resident and nonresident hunters 
in 2005.240  In 2005, North Dakota set a state record for resident hunters, 
with approximately 26,000 more hunting licenses purchased than in 1990, 
despite virtually no change in the state’s population.241  These record num-
bers will likely increase North Dakota’s $17.5 million total economic out-
put generated in 2001 from waterfowl hunting.242  North Dakota may also 
see the creation of more jobs because of the increase in hunters; in 2001, 
waterfowl hunting created an estimated 236 jobs in the state.243  The figures 
demonstrate why small town businesses opposed the nonresident hunting 
restrictions at issue in Hoeven.244  With nonresident hunters making sev-
enty-eight percent of their expenditures in rural areas, it is clear that even a 
minor decrease in the number of hunters due to the upheld restrictions could 
drastically impact rural businesses that depend on the influx of out-of-state 
customers.245 
Despite the economic concerns, North Dakota officials have pledged to 
continue to place residents first in addressing future wildlife regulations.246  
However, North Dakota residents may feel the negative effects of Hoeven 
in other states in the form of retaliatory legislation.247  Particularly in 
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Minnesota, retaliatory legislation is more than a possibility because a 
proposed bill would restrict nonresidents from fishing during the first two 
weeks of the season.248  However, state officials from Minnesota and North 
Dakota cautioned against strong reactions.249 
As for further state regulations, the 2007 North Dakota legislative 
session will not have the contentious atmosphere of two years ago when the 
original restrictions were put in place.250  Indeed, the legislature seemed to 
make a policy reversal by relaxing certain zoning restrictions against non-
resident waterfowl hunting.251  At the same time, certain bills that have 
been introduced implicate other wildlife management areas by calling for an 
increase in nonresident fees for a fishing license.252  Despite any increase in 
nonresident restrictions, state officials remain determined to attract nonresi-
dents to continue growing the state’s tourism industry and to support local 
communities that thrive on the incoming business.253 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Minnesota v. Hoeven, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
North Dakota’s restrictions on nonresident hunters, reaffirming states’ 
rights to manage wildlife resources within their borders.254  The court ne-
glected to reach the merits of the dormant Commerce Clause claim, instead 
holding the claim moot due to the passage of the “Reaffirmation of State 
Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 
2005.”255  The court also rejected Minnesota’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause claim because hunting is recreation and sport, which is not recog-
nized as part of the bundle of property rights associated with the ownership 
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